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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
an increased burden on the ability of the consumer to judge, for him-
self, the quality of the products he will purchase, and thus makes the
role of the independent tester-endorser increasingly more signifi-
cant. As this role enlarges, the duty of care which the independent
tester-endorser owes to the public must increase accordingly.
BRucE E. TiTus
Constitutional Law-TRuSTs-STATE ACTION UNDER THE FouR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT. Evans v. Abney, 90 S. Ct. 628 (1970).
The will of Senator A. 0. Bacon of Georgia conveyed property in
trust to his hometown of Macon, Georgia, to be used as a public park
exclusively for white people. In 1966, the Supreme Court held that the
park could not be operated on a racially discriminatory basis.' Follow-
ing that decision, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that since the
testator's intent to provide a park for the exclusive use of white people
had been legally frustrated, the trust must fail, and therefore, the
property by state law 2 must revert to the Senator's heirs.3
The Supreme Court affirmed 4 the Georgia decision on the ground
that the interpretation of wills has always been governed by state law,5
and that the termination of the trust was a proper application of
Georgia's racially neutral trust law." Justice Black, speaking for the
1. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). See 52 A.B.A.J. 276 (1966); 8 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 152 (1966).
2. GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 108-06(4) (1959). 'Vhere a trust is expressly created, but ...
[its] uses . . .fail from any cause, a resulting trust is implied for the benefit of the
grantor, or testator, or his heirs." See Adams v. Bass, 18 Ga. 130 (1855) (testator's
intent to settle his slaves in Indiana and Ohio was frustrated by statutes of the latter
states, the government held that cy pres was not applicable and that the testator died
intestate as to his slaves and that a trust resulted for his heirs).
3. Evans v. Abney, 224 Ga. 826, 165 S.E.2d 160 (1968). The Court also found that
the doctrine of cy pres was not applicable as segregation was an essential and
inseparable part of the testator's plan.
4. Evans v. Abney, 90 S. Ct. 628 (1970). Mr. Justice Brennan dissented on the
ground that the closing of the park was the result of discriminatory state action.
Id. at 636. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that reversion of the park to
the heirs is less in accord with the Senator's intent than retention of the park by the
city for municipal use. Id. at 635.
5. Id. at 633. See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 189, 193 (1938).
6. See 90 S. Ct. at 631. Other jurisdictions have reached similar results: First
Universalist Society v. Swett, 148 Me. 142, 90 A.2d 812 (1952) (bequest for support
of a specific church that had ceased to exist reverted to testator's estate by virtue
of a resulting trust); Bullard v. Shirley, 153 Mass. 559, 27 N.E. 766 (1891) (bequest to
town for support of a Unitarian clergyman was illegal, therefore the gift failed and
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Court, reasoned that the fourteenth amendment7 is not violated when
a state court applies "neutral and non-discriminatory"trust laws and
therefore, reaches a result that denies whites, as well as negroes,
the benefits of a trust. The Court did not find "state action" where
there existed at the time Senator Bacon executed his will a Georgia
statute permitting racial restrictions in trusts.8 The Court regretted the
loss of the city park as a result of a constitutional requirement to
integrate, but characterized the loss as a "part of the price we pay"
for freedom of testation.
In segregation cases, the existence of "state action" is a prerequisite
to obtaining the protection of the fourteenth amendment.10 In the past,
city ownership of a building containing a segregated restaurant," ad-
ministration of a segregated college by a public board of directors, 12
use of the courts to enable a "public" park to remain segregated, 13
judicial enforcement of a restrictive covenant, 14 suppression of free-
the money went to the testator's next of kin; La Fond v. City of Detroit, 357 Mich.
362, 98 N.V.2d 530 (1959) (bequest of a residuary estate to a city for a playfield for
white children was void as against public policy and the doctrine of cy pres was not
applicable). 4 A. Scotr, THE LAW oF TRuSmS § 399, at 3085 (1967), which states that
when the only purpose of the testator is impossible to accomplish, then the cy pres
doctrine is not applicable. See generally Comment, A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALz
LJ. 303 (1939).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall make or enforce any law ... nor
deny to any person .. . the equal protection of the laws."
8. GA. CoDE ANNr. § 69-504 (1967):
Any person may . .. devise . .. to any municipal corporation of this
State, . . . in trust, . . . lands . . . dedicated in perpetuity to the public
use as a park, pleasure ground .... and . . . by appropriate limitations
and conditions, provide that the use of said park, pleasure ground, or
other property . . . shall be limited to the white race only, or to white
women and children only, or to the colored race only ....
9. 90 S. Cr. at 633.
10. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883): "It is State action of a- particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject
matter of the amendment." See generally Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes For a
Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962); Horowitz, The Misleading Search For
"State Action" Under The Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL L. REv. 208 (1957);
Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLum. L. REv. 1083 (1960); Pollak, Racial
Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L.
Rav. 1 (1959); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1961);
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1959); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAs L. Rav. 347 (1963).
11. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
12. Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
13. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
14. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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dom of speech in a company-owned town, 5 prevention of Negro
voting in a primary election, 6 orders of a private park guard acting
under the color of his authority as a deputy sheriff,1 and the state-
ments of city officials that they would not permit negroes to seek
desegregation,' have all been held to constitute "state action."
In Evans v. Abney, the Court begins to delineate those acts of state
agencies that are insufficient to constitute state involvement in racial
discrimination. The decision enumerates two activities that lie beyond
the uncertain line that defines the limits of "state action." A state court
may enforce a neutral principle of trust law even if the result is to
aid a private testator's scheme of discrimination. The existence of a
state statute permitting racially restrictive trusts is not sufficient "state
action" to invalidate a trust made under the authority of such a
statute.' 9
To the extent that predictability in the law is desirable, the decision
will benefit society. Those seeking to discriminate against racial groups
may be encouraged, however, to push their activities to the limit of
what is now a more clearly defined area of law.
FRED K. MORRISON
Constitutional Law-THE IN-SERVICE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR.
Goguen v. Clifford, 304 F. Supp. 958 (D. N.J. 1969).
After his induction into the United States Army, Private Philip W.
Goguen applied for discharge on the basis that he had become a con-
scientious objector to all war.' Although his sincerity was unquestioned,
Goguen's commanding officer denied the application on the grounds
that his request was based on "essentially political, sociological or philo-
sophical views, or a merely personal moral code" and not upon religious
15. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
16. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
17. Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
18. Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
19. But cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (article of state constitution
prohibiting state from denying right of any person to decline to sell his real property
to such person as he in his absolute discretion chooses would involve the state in
unconstitutional racial discrimination).
1. ARMY REGULATION 635-20 (May 1, 1967) provides for a procedure whereby re-
quest for discharge may be made on grounds of conscientious objection to war which
arose after admission to the military. The regulation was implemented in accordance
with DEPARTMENT oF DEFENSE DIRECrIVE 1300.6 (revised May 1968).
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